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Financial stability is one of the main objectives of bank regulations globally. Over the 
past decades, several rules and policy measures have been implemented to mitigate the 
propagation of risks in the financial system. However, these regulations can have a multitude 
of effects at the bank and system-wide levels. The aim of this thesis is to enhance our 
understanding of bank regulations and their implications on the financial system. The thesis 
makes substantial contributions to the literature by providing new findings on the desirable 
and undesirable effects of recent regulations in Australia and the US in three separate studies.  
Using a simulation technique, the first study quantifies the size of capital buffers 
required to reduce system-wide losses of Australian banks. The results suggest that a 
moderate increase in bank capital buffers is sufficient to maintain financial system resilience, 
even after taking economic downturns into consideration. Furthermore, while banks benefit 
from paying a lower cost of debt when they have a higher capital buffer, lending volumes are 
lower indicating that credit supply may be hampered if bank capital levels are too high within 
a financial system.   
The second study presents a comprehensive assessment of the impacts of the Federal 
Reserve crisis liquidity programs using US bank holding company data. The main finding is 
that the liquidity programs were ex-ante efficient as they targeted illiquid banks with low core 
stable funding sources, and participants experienced an increase in liquidity creation and loan 
growth. However, there was a pervasive shift in bank risk taking that increased their stock 
return synchronicity following liquidity support. Most importantly, while there is strong 
evidence of an increase in loan supply by banks that accessed the programs that supported 
short-term funding, these banks are subject to greater stigma effect, and thus pose higher 
crash risk relative to other banks. 
The third study examines the effect of banning proprietary trading by banks (the 
Volcker Rule) on financial stability. There are three channels through which the Volcker Rule 
impacts bank-level and systemic risks: revenue diversification, bank similarity, and 
proprietary trading activity. While the reduction in proprietary trading lowers the directly 
targeted banks’ systemic risk, an unintended consequence is that greater similarity between 
banks increases the risk that they default at the same time and thus raises the probability of a 
systemic default. Banks that were not engaged in proprietary trading are also affected by the 
Volcker Rule through this similarity channel. 
